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The Governance of Collaboration in Complex 
Projects 
Abstract 
Purpose  
Inter-organisational collaboration is becoming increasingly important in complex projects; 
some project customers even formally require evidence of collaborative competence from 
potential providers. This paper explores the governance of collaboration and the ways in 
which it is enacted in practice for complex projects. In particular, the emerging role of 
collaboration standards and their impact on contracts and relational governance is examined. 
Design/methodology  
The study is based on a qualitative analysis of 29 semi-structured interviews, primary data 
from meetings and events supported by secondary data, including standards and industry-
specific contract templates.  
Findings  
The paper identifies how collaboration can be effectively governed in complex projects 
through the emerging role of collaboration standards and their impact on contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms. The standard sets higher-level institutional guidelines that 
affect the way in which collaboration is governed in complex projects. It helps formalise 
informal relational practices whilst also providing guidelines for building flexibility in 
contracts by including coordination and adaptation-oriented provisions conducive to 
collaboration.  
Originality/Value  
The paper demonstrates the emerging role of the collaboration standard and its influence on 
contractual and relational mechanisms deployed in complex projects. It shows how the 
standard can formalise and codify informal collaborative practices and help transfer related 
learning across projects, thereby contributing towards the dual requirement for 
standardisation and flexibility in project settings. 
Paper Type 
Research paper 
Keywords 
Project management, governance, complex projects, inter-organisational collaboration, 
standardisation 
 
2 
1 Introduction  
Collaboration is increasingly seen as a preferred way of delivering complex projects 
involving multiple partners, suppliers and customers (Acha et al., 2004; Davies and Hobday, 
2005). Collaborative competence amongst partnering firms is a necessity to successfully 
manage large-scale, multi-organisation projects (Davies, 2004). Collaboration is defined in 
this paper as ‘the commitment to working together with two or more parties to create value 
by striving to achieve shared competitive goals and operational benefits through a spirit of 
mutual trust and openness’ (Institute for Collaborative Working: ICW, 2016). Collaboration 
can be challenging in temporary, project-based settings, especially when the involved 
organisations lack prior experience of working together: ‘one of the biggest risks to large-
scale infrastructure projects is conflict emerging between consortium partners who have not 
co-operated before’ (Financial Times, 2016). Collaborative culture, norms and practices take 
time to develop; this implies challenges in the context of time-limited projects (DeFillippi 
and Sydow, 2016; Jones et al., 1997). Accordingly, collaboration in complex projects is often 
considered particularly challenging; and needs to be governed effectively. 
As an example of the emerging need to govern collaboration in complex projects, consider 
the ongoing United Kingdom (UK) High Speed 2 (HS2) project for building a fast railway 
initially linking London with Birmingham, and later with Leeds and Manchester. To this date, 
the HS2 project organisation has spent close to £1 million to formally test the collaborative 
behaviour and abilities of bidding alliances (Financial Times, 2016). More broadly, project 
alliances and their members aim for competitive advantage on the basis of their abilities to 
collaborate, which can in turn enable improved governance in specific projects (Vangen et 
al., 2015). Project governance refers to the governance of individual projects. It comprises a 
consistent method of controlling the project and enacting sets of practices that are reliable and 
repeatable across projects (Müller et al., 2014), one of which is collaborative practices. This 
suggests that whilst successful delivery of complex projects requires flexibility to respond to 
unique customer requirements (Davies and Hobday, 2005), the governance structures of 
complex projects can be replicated across multiple projects yielding possibilities for 
efficiency in subsequent ventures (Brady and Davies, 2004; Müller et al., 2014).  
Prior research has stressed the benefits of formalising experience-based know-how on 
inter-organisational collaboration to be used in subsequent endeavours (e.g., Davies et al., 
2016; Lowendahl et al., 2001). This process should allow project organisations to benefit 
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simultaneously from the flexibility required to customise output and from the standardisation 
of processes driving operational efficiency (Davies and Brady, 2000). Huxham et al. (2000) 
have suggested that inter-firm relationships in projects, ‘[…] if left to [their] own devices, 
[are] more likely to have a negative effect than to lead to a collaborative advantage’ (p. 352). 
Nevertheless, there is still a limited understanding of how to govern inter-firm collaboration 
and use experiential learning across different projects to gain competitive advantage (Maylor 
et al., 2015). This paper aims to empirically explore the governance of collaboration in 
project-based operations. In line with Vangen et al. (2015, p. 1246), the paper uses this term 
to refer to ‘the structure, processes, actions and decisions that enable collaboration both 
within and across projects’. Unlike the literature on exchange governance, which tends to 
treat collaborative norms as an integral part of relational governance mechanisms (e.g., 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002), this paper stresses that in time-finite, project-based operations 
collaboration itself needs to be governed. 
The paper focuses on complex projects (Davies and Brady, 2000), which entail networks 
of both vertical and horizontal relationships. This is complementary to settings of more 
permanent operations that typically involve long-term, mostly vertical inter-organisational 
relationships (IORs) (Cao and Lumineau, 2015). Complex projects exhibit high complexity, 
as a result of their time span, the bundling of capital equipment and services and the 
coordination of multiple organisations (Brady et al., 2005; Lewis and Roehrich, 2009). The 
governance of collaboration is often problematic in complex projects and requires robust 
mechanisms of different types (Caldwell and Howard, 2014; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). The 
paper poses the following research question: How do project firms govern inter-
organisational collaboration in complex projects? 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature 
on inter-organisational collaboration in complex projects, exchange governance mechanisms 
and institutional level influences in complex projects. The qualitative research design is 
discussed in the third section, followed by presentation of the findings in section 4. The paper 
concludes in section 5 by discussing the findings and elucidating research and managerial 
contributions as well as avenues for further research. 
2 Literature review 
In the first subsection of the literature review, collaboration is discussed in the context of 
complex projects. The second subsection reviews the literature on exchange governance 
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mechanisms, whilst the third focuses on institutional influences in the governance of 
collaboration in complex projects.  
2.1 Inter-organisational collaboration for effective delivery of complex projects 
Complex projects deliver products, services and technologies that are tailored to the needs of 
industrial customers (Acha et al., 2004; Davies and Brady, 2000; Davies and Hobday, 2005). 
Some examples include air traffic control systems, infrastructure projects, advanced 
manufacturing equipment or mass transportation systems. Such projects entail long time 
frames and the coordination of multiple interdependent project stakeholders (Brady et al., 
2005; Davies, 2004; Lewis and Roehrich, 2009). They often require forming a project 
organisation in which multiple partners, suppliers, customers and even competitors work 
together in consortia, alliances or joint ventures (Acha et al., 2004; Davies and Brady, 2000). 
For example, consider the British Petroleum (BP) Andrew Alliance. This is an offshore oil 
and gas field, where initially BP was not able to conduct any work due to high operational 
risks (Broome, 2002). Revisiting the project led BP to conclude that the £450 million 
extraction costs were not feasible using its conventional project management practices. 
Instead, BP decided to form a strategic alliance with seven contractors, using a pain/gain 
share open book contract (Mendelson and Ziegler, 1999). The Alliance adopted a structured 
approach to collaboration by working as an integrated team sharing common systems, risks 
and incentives. This approach allowed the completion of the project six months ahead of 
schedule, at a cost of £290 million. The UK National Audit Office identifies the BP Andrew 
Alliance as an example of successful governance of collaborative relationships (NAO, 2006).  
Complex projects have three major contingent characteristics. First, the temporary nature 
of project-based partnerships (Davies and Hobday, 2005) renders collaboration more 
challenging mainly due to the limited time available to build cooperative norms and mutual 
trust amongst project partners. Second, complex projects are highly complicated and unique 
in terms of the capital resources and coordination required for multiple organisations, 
resulting in uncertainty in planning and forecasting (Brady et al., 2005; Lewis and Roehrich, 
2009). Third, organisational structures and hierarchies can be ambiguous for complex 
projects since a multitude of firms, teams and individuals are involved. Accordingly, the 
governance of collaboration in complex projects can refer to both vertical (e.g., contractor–
subcontractors) and horizontal (e.g., bidding consortium partners) relationships comprising 
different levels of teams, projects, firms, joint ventures/consortia and alliances. 
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Governance of collaboration is instrumental for achieving both project-specific and cross-
project performance goals that differ in nature (DeFillippi and Sydow, 2016; Vangen et al., 
2015). Accordingly, governance of collaboration aims to simultaneously achieve a balance 
between the flexibility required for bespoke project needs and the standardisation needed for 
organisational efficiency. An excessive focus on flexibility can undermine managerial 
predictability and operational efficiency, whilst too much standardisation can inhibit 
autonomous decision-making and innovative problem-solving. Complex project providers 
seek efficiency through cross-project repeatability in terms of partners, processes, routines 
and practices (Manning and Sydow, 2011). In this vein, providers aim to achieve economies 
of repetition, as noted by DeFillippi and Sydow (2016):  
‘Project networks experience tensions between standard operating procedures (routines) 
and customized crafted solutions to the challenges of unexpected or innovative project work 
tasks and challenges. Standardizing policies provide economies of repetition and repeatable 
solutions (Davies & Brady, 2000). However, these standardizing policies can become 
dysfunctional when a project or a series of projects contains unique (innovative) 
requirements’ (p. 8). 
2.2 Inter-organisational exchange governance  
IORs are governed through contractual and relational mechanisms (Cao and Lumineau, 2015; 
Wacker et al., 2016), both of which are relevant to inter-organisational collaboration in 
projects. Contractual governance concerns formal, explicit and legally enforceable inter-
organisational agreements that define the roles, rights and responsibilities of exchange parties 
and establish safeguards against potential opportunism (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). On the 
other hand, relational governance refers to informal, socially derived norms in managing 
exchange risks and uncertainty and coordinating inter-organisational collaboration (Zhou and 
Xu, 2012). The notion of relational governance is multi-dimensional and includes several 
socially derived mechanisms, such as trust, commitment, flexibility norms and information 
and knowledge sharing (Wacker et al., 2016). For example, trust, commitment and shared 
understanding are perceived as the prime factors influencing the success of collaborative 
project initiatives (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Relational governance includes encouraging 
personal means of interaction through informal project meetings, job rotations and top 
management support along with shared events, workshops, conferences and technological 
platforms (Müller et al., 2014). 
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Contracts are usually agreed upon between two (or more) organisations and can perform 
different functions in exchange relationships. The traditional view focuses on safeguarding 
against potential opportunism, where detailed legal clauses protect the asset-specific 
investments of parties and hedge against transaction uncertainty (Schepker et al., 2014). 
Examples of safeguarding provisions include termination rights, assignment of property 
rights and penalties for non-performance (Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). However, more recent 
literature has argued that in addition to safeguarding, formal contracts can signal commitment 
and serve as tools for coordination and adaptation (Cao and Lumineau, 2015; Schepker et 
al., 2014). For example, clauses may require establishing inter-organisational information-
sharing routines, joint performance reviews and problem solving, renegotiations and 
variations in prices and resources (Selviaridis, 2016). Furthermore, the different functions of 
contracts can interact with collaboration (and relational norms more broadly) in a variable 
manner (Cao and Lumineau, 2015). Indeed, whilst contractual provisions stressing 
safeguarding and control tend to inhibit the development of collaborative norms, coordination 
and adaptation provisions serve as flexible frameworks for relationship management and 
reinforce the collaborative atmosphere in IORs (Lumineau and Henderson, 2012).  
Formal contracts and relational norms can be viewed either as substitutes for each other, or 
as complements, or both (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Woolthuis et al., 2005). For example, 
contracts with gain/pain share provisions are regarded as devices for goal and incentive 
alignment, because they tie compensation to specified performance targets (Caldwell and 
Howard, 2014; Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). In longer lasting relationships in which the 
parties have accumulated knowledge of each other, formal contracts and trust tend to be 
complementary, impacting performance positively (Mayer and Argyres, 2004). However, 
formal governance mechanisms may actually be detrimental insofar as they preclude intrinsic 
sources of motivation and trust, undermine the development of relational norms and 
collaboration routines and elicit opportunistic behaviour (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). On the 
other hand, contracts can reinforce collaboration in cases where formal provisions stress 
increased transparency, expectations of collaborative behaviour and flexibility to adjust to 
changing circumstances (Schepker et al., 2014). 
2.3 Institutional influences on the governance of collaboration in complex projects 
The governance of IORs and inter-organisational collaboration is embedded in the social and 
cultural context. Accordingly, key stakeholders can influence the governance of collaboration 
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through shaping the institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) within which 
collaboration takes place. Such influence affects the governance of exchange relationships 
and thereby project collaborations, through setting social and cultural expectations. In the 
UK, government departments commission reports to shape institutional environments in 
order to address industry-wide issues and failures. For example, the policy documents of the 
Egan Report (1998) and NAO (2001) identified the construction industry as underperforming 
and ineffective, with adversarial and fragmented relationships underpinned by inconsistent 
procurement practices. The Egan Report (1998) was amongst the first influential institutional 
drivers for collaborative projects in the construction industry, proposing partnering in 
complex projects with integrated project processes and long-term relationships replacing 
competitive tendering. This drive has been amplified over the years as the official strategic 
plan of the UK Government is to use its position to drive collaboration to deliver better value 
for the taxpayer (Government Construction Strategy, 2016). 
Institutional influences can affect the performance and behaviour of firms because 
companies are dependent on the resources derived from the institutional environment 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The delivery of complex projects often requires a 
simultaneous use of adaptation, coordination and safeguarding within a project network 
(Jones et al., 1997). Coordination and safeguarding necessitate focal firms to build and 
maintain longer-term relationships within networks (Manning and Sydow, 2011), while 
adaptation builds on flexible use of inter-organisational networks. A cluster of structurally 
embedded companies that interact relatively frequently (Manning and Sydow, 2011) can 
create a common macro-culture that is a key element for the governance of a network (Jones 
et al., 1997). Such institutional influences go beyond the level of individual projects and 
relationships to sustain and exploit a number of relationships in a series of interlinked 
projects taking place over a longer period of time (Brady and Davies, 2004; Manning and 
Sydow, 2011). 
A means to achieve such institutional influences is through certified management standards 
such as ISO 9001 and ISO 14001. These standards provide crucial guidelines for the 
companies that implement them, thus reducing information asymmetries between buyers and 
potential suppliers (King et al., 2005; Terlaak and King, 2006). This may enable better 
supplier selection through information that otherwise would have been difficult to acquire 
(Christmann and Taylor, 2006). Using standards to provide the relevant information is 
particularly useful when parties are physically, socially, culturally or institutionally distant 
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because they may have fewer options through which to acquire the information directly (King 
et al., 2005). Of course, there is a risk that companies may choose to implement the standards 
only symbolically to attain positive legitimacy or brand impact rather than amending their 
organisation and operations according to the requirements set by the standard (Christmann 
and Taylor, 2006). Regarding the governance of collaboration in complex projects, standards 
may have a role despite the fact that collaboration has traditionally been perceived as 
emergent and not easily standardisable. The next section describes the methods applied to 
studying the governance of inter-organisational collaboration in complex projects. 
3 Research methods 
The governance of collaboration in complex projects is an understudied and emerging topic, 
hence it necessitates an approach that can elicit rich empirical insights into the actual 
practices used (Meredith, 1998). It was therefore decided to study in a qualitative fashion the 
real-life practices applied by organisations that deliver project-based combinations of 
products, services and technologies in collaboration with their partners (Miles et al., 2013). 
This exploratory qualitative approach entailed 29 qualitative interviews (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000; Strauss and Corbin, 1998) with key informants employed by the studied companies or 
acting as advisors/facilitators of collaboration on behalf of these organisations. The interview 
data were complemented by analyses of secondary data, including the international standard 
for collaboration, ISO 44001, and the industry-level contracts that facilitate inter-firm 
collaboration, as well as primary data obtained from participation in events and meetings. 
Regarding the collaboration standard, the British Standard for Collaboration BS 11000 was 
introduced in 2010 and was recently ratified as international standard ISO 44001. 
3.1 Sampling logic 
The unit of analysis is the governance of collaboration in complex projects. The empirical 
enquiry is focused on understanding the way in which firms govern their collaborations with 
partners through formal and informal means. As part of this exploratory study, the data is 
collected from primary contractors that are part of a joint venture or alliance and are 
contractually responsible for delivering the complex project. The focus has been on these 
primary project partners, as these are the key entities that decide and implement the 
appropriate mechanisms to govern collaboration in a project. 
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To develop in-depth understanding of the governance of collaboration, experienced 
individuals operating in complex project environments were selected as the interviewees. The 
study’s participants were sampled from two main types. The first type comprised respondents 
from companies directly involved in the delivery of complex projects. The second type 
involved respondents who advised the organisations of the first type or focused on the 
facilitation of inter-organisational collaboration. The second type was included in the study 
because such organisations were identified as playing a central role in driving the governance 
mechanisms applied in different industries. Their insights also enabled some triangulation 
(Diefenbach, 2009) of the perspectives of the companies of the first type. Furthermore, the 
data from the first type of organisation enabled observations on the more detailed governance 
mechanisms and related processes. The interviews with the representatives of the second type 
of companies helped elicit depth and breadth of information on contractual governance across 
different industries. 
The selection of organisations in the first group was based on theoretical sampling (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998) in the sense that the authors defined fourfold specific qualifying criteria 
for inclusion in the study. First, each organisation’s main business had to be directly linked to 
the delivery of complex projects where a number of providers collaborated on delivery and 
provision, as this was the study’s focus. The authors targeted industries where highly 
complex and networked operations were dominant because this would maximise the chances 
of learning from the numerous existing collaborations in these contexts. Second, each firm’s 
business had to be based on a series of project deliveries instead of continuous manufacturing 
or service provision. This criterion was essential since the governance of collaboration in a 
context in which business relationships were inherently discontinuous would be expected to 
differ from more permanent operational settings. Third, each company had to emphasise 
developing effective practices to drive inter-firm collaboration that ought to be central for the 
success of its business. This criterion was crucial as the study aimed to investigate practices 
adopted by best-of-breed organisations investing resources in the area. Fourth, due to the 
nature of the complex projects, data collection focused on companies operating in business-
to-business (B2B) or business-to-government contexts to deliver large-scale projects.  
The first type of sampled organisation included construction and civil engineering 
industries, the provision of technology and B2B services and the delivery of highly complex 
technological systems (see Table 1). The second type of organisation comprised independent 
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consultants and institutions facilitating the adoption of best practices for inter-organisational 
collaboration.  
Table 1. Details of interviews across different industries 
Industry 
group 
Company 
pseudonym 
Interviewee job title Interview 
number 
Interview 
length 
Construction/ 
civil 
engineering 
Constructor A Head of Supply Chain 1 00:39:41 
Constructor B Collaboration Co-ordinator 2 00:29:40 
Constructor C Head of Corporate 
Responsibility 
3 01:16:31 
Constructor D Quality Manager 4 00:38:53 
Constructor E Business Improvement 
Manager 
5  
&  
6 
01:13:00 & 
00:41:22 
“ Business Improvement 
Director 
7 00:54:01 
“ Construction Manager 8 01:13:37 
Civil engineering Framework Director 9 01:11:02 
Engineering A Project Support Manager 10 01:32:08 
Engineering B Senior Quality and 
Collaborative Work Consultant 
11 00:40:03 
Engineering C Construction Manager 12 00:38:58 
Technology 
and  
B2B services 
Tech A Enterprise Strategy Consultant 13 01:21:36 
Tech B Regional Manager 14 01:03:57 
Tech C UK Technology Sales Director 15 00:38:43 
Tech D Sales and Marketing Director 16 01:04:49 
Highly 
complex 
critical 
systems 
Aerospace Director of Government 
Relations 
17 01:10:30 
Air traffic Senior Purchasing Manager 18 01:23:16 
Rail Collaborative Work Manager 19 01:33:55 
Organisations 
outside the UK 
 
Constructor Sweden Partnering Manager 20 
21 
01:18:43 
03:46:08 
Buildings Sweden Managing Director 22 00:29:25 
Defender USA Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defence for Maintenance 
23 00:53:29 
Independent 
advisors 
Consultant A Consultant  24 00:55:51 
Consultant B Consultant 25 01:27:59 
Coach A Executive Coach 26 01:06:18 
Collaboration 
facilitators 
Collaborator Senior Associate 27 01:07:35 
“ Associate Director 28 00:49:55 
Standards Adjudicator Compliance & Risk Director 29 01:40:55 
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3.2 Data collection and analysis 
The main source of primary data comprised the 29 semi-structured interviews conducted by 
the authors, as outlined in Table 1. In addition, a wide range of secondary data sources were 
obtained including reports, guidelines, descriptions of standards and contract templates, some 
of which were confidential project contracts shared with the research team. These are 
presented in Table 2, together with additional primary data, such as observations of meetings, 
events, workshops and site visits organised to discuss collaboration in project contexts. The 
data collection began in 2015 and was conducted over an 18-month period. The initial 
interviews were held to understand the contexts, inter-organisational dynamics and particular 
focus areas of each studied industry and company. Interviews gradually became more 
focused to delve into governance mechanisms and beyond the easily accessible insights of the 
informants by comparing and contrasting different collaborations based on the interviewees’ 
work histories (see Appendix A for the interview protocol). The data collection was 
continued until theoretical saturation was reached (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000) and no 
significant new insights were obtained in relation to governance mechanisms. The interviews 
ranged from 29 minutes to 1 hour and 40 minutes, with an average duration of 1 hour and 13 
minutes. The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim to allow systematic data 
analysis and ensure that the analysis maintained the focus on the central themes, thereby 
yielding the richest and most valuable insights. Secondary data were collected to gain a more 
detailed understanding of the role of contracts and standards in the governance of inter-firm 
collaboration, which included the BS 11000/ISO 44001 collaboration standard and industry-
level contract templates such as NEC3, SPC2000 and FAC1 (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Secondary data and additional primary data collected 
Secondary data 
Document 
number 
Type Document title 
D1 Report Competency frameworks for collaboration in B2B services 
D2 Report Project Collaboration Toolkit for the Oil & Gas sector: Enhancing 
project performance through collaboration  
D3 Guidelines National Alliance contracting guidelines 
D4 Description of 
standard 
BS 11000: Collaborative Business Relationships Part 1 
D5 Description of 
standard 
BS 11000: Collaborative Business Relationships Part 2 
D6 Description of 
standard 
ISO 44001: Collaborative Business Relationships Management 
Systems 
D7 Contract template PPC2000: Standard form of project partnering contract 
D8 Contract template SPC2000: Specialist project partnering contract  
D9 Contract template NEC3: National engineering and construction contract 
D10 Contract template FAC1: Framework Alliance Contract  
D11 Code of practice HM Treasury Alliance code of practice for infrastructure projects 
Additional primary data 
Event 
number 
Date Event description 
E1 10/2015 Collaboration Professionals Membership Committee Meeting  
E2 12/2015 ICW Annual Collaboration Awards event  
E3 05/2016 Project site visit and tour with Constructor E 
E4 06/2016 Understanding the Capabilities of Collaboration and Behavioural 
Consultants Event  
E5 06/2016 Future of Collaboration Workshop 
E6 06/2016 Project site visit with Constructor Sweden 
E7 09/2016 Collaborative Working Executive Network Meeting 
E8 10/2016 Collaboration Professionals Membership Committee Meeting 
E9 10/2016 Effective Collaboration in Digital Sector Event 
E10 11/2016 British Standards Institute: Collaboration Event 
E11 12/2016 ICW Annual Collaboration Awards event 
E12 01/2017 Collaborative Working Executive Network Meeting 
E13 03/2017 Insight Into ISO44001 – The Next Evolution of Collaborative Working 
E14 03/2017 British Standards Institute: Collaboration Event 
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To analyse the data set, the principles of template analysis were adopted (King, 2012). The 
initial coding template only included two higher-level aggregate themes (i.e. contractual and 
relational governance) in order to allow for flexible and open coding to enable themes emerge 
from data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The coding process included identifying and storing 
quotes, events, objects, interpretations and observations, which are referred to as data items 
(or codes). These were then collectively collapsed into a smaller number of categories called 
first-order themes (King, 2012) and were labelled with a descriptive term. New themes were 
added when the analysis identified findings that did not fit the existing structure (Miles et al., 
2013). The first-order themes led to an initial understanding of inter-organisational 
collaboration and its governance, which allowed for further classification through collapsing 
these under second-order themes.  
The data set was initially coded by one researcher and later cross-checked and ratified by 
each of the other two researchers. Hence, investigator triangulation was used to ensure the 
findings’ validity (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). The relationships amongst the various 
categories were interpreted using abductive reasoning towards the ‘most likely’ explanation 
(Mantere and Ketokivi, 2013). As the analysis unfolded, the coding structure was extended, 
refined and empirically substantiated to form the findings. The initial coding structure with 
contractual and relational mechanisms as the aggregate dimensions was extended through the 
abductive process of iteration between the data and the literature, where the emerging role of 
standards became strongly evident. Accordingly, the literature on the role of management 
standards was considered and the standards were labelled as the third aggregate theme in the 
coding template. The results are presented in the findings section and are structured according 
to the three aggregate categories of mechanisms governing inter-firm collaboration: 
collaboration standards, contractual mechanisms and relational mechanisms. Appendix B 
presents the coding structure. 
4 Findings: Governance of inter-firm collaboration in complex projects 
Inter-firm collaboration in complex projects is managed by contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms whose design and implementation is influenced by the standard. 
The emergence of the standard for the governance of collaboration has been an understudied 
area compared to the use of contracts and relational mechanisms. All three mechanisms are 
interlinked and concurrently enacted within the studied complex projects in order to 
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proactively govern inter-firm collaboration amongst project partners. These findings are 
elaborated in the following subsections.  
4.1 Standards to govern collaboration 
4.1.1 The emergence of standards 
The empirical research reveals an overarching demand across industries for systematic ways 
of demonstrating collaborative competence in complex projects. Major clients in various 
industries, such as construction, transportation and managed services, increasingly demand 
systematic evidence of effective collaboration in their tender documents. Certain interviewees 
pointed out that UK Network Rail, HS2 and Highways England now include collaborative 
behaviour assessments that can account for up to 20% of their overall evaluation of an 
alliance bid for complex project contracts (see also Financial Times, 2016). Importantly, UK 
government departments have also adopted these requirements: 
The MoD [Ministry of Defence] and other government departments almost always 
now talk about collaborative working in their tender documentation for bids for 
contracts (Quality Manager, Constructor D). 
A respondent provided examples of how clients test collaborative competence of suppliers: 
We now do collaboration assessment workshops with potential partners and suppliers. 
This allowed us to identify early on that for some suppliers, motivation to collaborate 
was purely to profit or to be part of intellectual property. Hence we are getting better 
at screening those out early on (Regional Manager, Tech B). 
The data show that the standard operates at the institutional level and affects the 
governance of IORs in complex projects. In particular, the standard plays an important role in 
shaping the governance agenda for inter-firm collaboration by informing the design and use 
of both contractual and relational mechanisms. This was echoed by various interviewees, who 
pointed out the wider acceptance of the collaboration standard across different industries. In 
particular, some companies have started to require their potential suppliers to adopt the 
collaboration standard: 
Some industry players have adopted collaboration wholeheartedly and, some have 
actually said you can't do business with us as a supplier unless you're certified with 
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the standard. For example, Network Rail do that (Framework Director, Civil 
engineering). 
A respondent from a large engineering firm indicated how adherence to the collaboration 
standard has spread across industries and has gradually become a norm for working together 
with project partners: 
So taking that success model from a pilot project for the Highways and a pilot 
framework in Water, we then took it to all the other Water frameworks. And then with 
the Highways job, more and more jobs gradually, more and more went that way and 
then it started becoming the norm (Senior Quality and Collaborative Work 
Consultant, Engineering B).  
It is believed the role of the collaboration standard will garner further practical attention in 
the future, due to its recent ratification as an international standard. This is extremely relevant 
for project firms operating in complex settings as major clients are more likely to mandate the 
collaboration standard even as a prerequisite to compete for projects: 
As the standard progressed towards an ISO standard, it is now going to make even 
more difference because an ISO standard is more likely to be mandated by the 
customers than a British standard (Head of Supply Chain, Constructor A). 
However, the use of the standard as a framework to collaborate with project partners 
constituted a change from traditional ways of working. As a result, this has posed various 
challenges for firms implementing the standard in complex projects. These are detailed next. 
4.1.2 Implementation challenges  
The collaboration standard is seen as a tool to boost collaborative performance in project 
environments. The respondents pointed out that the BS 11000/ISO 44001 standard requires 
firms to provide tangible evidence of collaborative behaviours and culture embedded within 
the projects to achieve certification. Because culture is intangible, it can be difficult to 
demonstrate a collaborative culture in a concrete manner. A recurrent challenge mentioned in 
the interviews was related to the issue of socialising the standard within the project 
organisations. This referred to building culture and behaviours conducive to collaboration as 
well as designing the appropriate managerial and governance mechanisms to support them: 
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So [we need to be] doing more than ticking the boxes, and actually embedding the 
culture in the organisation, and keeping that momentum up so that teams have an 
awareness and understanding (Senior Quality and Collaborative Work Consultant, 
Engineering B). 
Furthermore, many interviewees pointed out that whilst leadership and executive support 
is essential, a collaborative culture requires more. Managerial support must therefore be 
introduced through training, development and annual reappraisals, in order to build a 
collaborative culture: 
It’s impossible to just have one or two people responsible for collaboration and it has 
to be embedded in our entire relationship management function. So there’s an on-
going training and development challenge and awareness challenge (Business 
Improvement Director, Constructor E). 
The implementation of support mechanisms was often facilitated by external behavioural 
consultants who specialise in collaboration in large projects; however, this gave rise to further 
challenges and risks. In particular, there were challenges regarding the extent to which 
external experts could create or help in building a collaboration culture that adhered to the 
standard’s guidelines. Several respondents pointed to the creation of an army of collaboration 
consultants that see collaborative projects as ‘cash cows’. In addition, seeing the standard as a 
‘box ticking exercise’ was considered to be amongst the key challenges. This was also 
discussed in the events organised by the Institute of Collaborative Working (ICW), where the 
chief proponents of the standard even voiced concerns indicating ‘the standard can be its own 
biggest enemy’ (E10, Table 2) through demonstrating instances in which the certification 
process was carried out purely to satisfy client requirements rather than adopting principles of 
collaboration effectively.  
4.1.3 Formalization of collaboration 
The BS 11000/ISO 44001 standard is formed from sets of overarching guidelines for 
facilitating inter-firm collaboration; it does not explicitly specify how contractual and 
relational mechanisms should be enacted in practice. In other words, the role of the standard 
is to describe what collaboration entails but not how it is actually enacted in different 
contexts. This then leaves space for the much-needed flexibility to accommodate the 
unpredictability of the complex project environments. 
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The collaboration standard aims to systematically formalise structures for inter-firm 
collaboration with clients, partners and suppliers. This approach can contribute to the benefits 
a partnering firm receives from established collaboration practices in subsequent complex 
projects, thereby achieving economies of repetition. The standard’s guidelines include terms 
and conditions that govern inter-firm interactions and outline roles, responsibilities, 
accountabilities and authorities in collaborative inter-firm relationships. The guidelines 
include the entire lifecycle of collaboration, from initial engagement and leadership 
involvement to the exit strategy that details contract termination. 
The standard’s governance guidelines clearly indicate the need to manage the trade-offs 
between operational efficiency and the flexibility required in collaborative environments. 
Whilst the governance framework set by the standard allows formalising key practices of 
collaboration, it also provides flexibility for partnering firms to define these key practices in 
their contexts. Accordingly, the collaboration standard aims to provide a balance between 
standardisation and flexibility. Particularly, it suggests that partnering firms should ensure: 
- that the governance processes are sufficiently robust to demonstrate effective 
assurance and accountability within a collaborative arrangement;  
 - that the governance processes are sufficiently agile and adaptable to ensure that the 
potential value could be realized from collaboration (ISO 44001, 2016, p. 8). 
The collaboration standard offers several suggestions on how to achieve flexibility in 
contracts and standardisation in relationship management. For instance, the standard requires 
contract terms to be reviewed to determine clarity of purpose, encourage appropriate 
behaviour and identify the potential impacts on conflicts. Additionally, all performance 
requirements and measurement methods are to be mutually agreed on to ensure clarity. Risk 
and reward models, issue management, exit strategy, knowledge transfer and sustainability 
should be considered during the development of a formal contract. At the same time, the 
standard provides a structure for governing relationships in an attempt to formalise relational 
mechanisms, as follows: 
A Joint Relationship Management Plan may be established and annexed to 
agreements or contractual arrangements to formalize the overall management of the 
collaborative business relationship and encompass the principles of collaborative 
behaviour (ISO 44001, 2016, p. 30). 
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The data show that the standard’s operational implications for collaboration are embedded 
in industry-specific contracting frameworks, such as NEC3, SPC2000 and FAC1. Moreover, 
the standard formalises the requirement for relational mechanisms to build mutual trust and 
confidence for collaboration. These mechanisms include the formation of integrated project 
teams, dispute resolution mechanisms, collaborative training initiatives for skills 
development and early contractor involvement. By requiring the use of relational 
mechanisms, the standard enables kick-starting the relationship-building process, which is 
especially valuable for collaboration in complex projects. 
It [the standard] gives us a better framework to work with our customers, and it moves 
from a supply customer relationship effectively to a partnership between the clients 
and us (Business Improvement Manager, Constructor E). 
The standard allows you to look at the supply chain and have a collaborative 
framework with your supply chain. […] Suppliers are more successful; they have a 
positive working relationship with us as a prime contractor. Therefore, they’re more 
likely to want to work with us in the future rather than our competitors (Enterprise 
Strategy Consultant, Tech A). 
The formalisation of collaboration also contributes to learning across projects. This is 
sometimes achieved through designing exit strategies. The standard recommends explicit 
agreement on an exit strategy that helps codify lessons learned from the project by the 
partners. This topic had rarely been discussed at the onset of collaborative projects before the 
introduction of the collaboration standard: 
Exit strategy wasn’t an area where we’ve done as much work as needed that also 
came out of the BS 11000 and getting ready for certification (Construction Manager, 
Constructor E).  
The cross-project learning that is facilitated by the formalisation of collaboration was seen 
as contributing to operational improvements not only for the specific project, but also for 
future projects and the organisation as a whole: 
You are learning and you're building it into your system. You're not creating this 
massive beast just for collaboration that is standalone cottage industry. You each try 
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to tweak your existing systems to improve for the next time around (Quality Manager, 
Constructor D). 
4.2 The role of formal contracts in the governance of collaboration 
4.2.1 Contracts for collaboration 
The data show that the type and nature of a contract has a significant impact on whether 
collaboration is effective. Traditional transactional contracts are considered inappropriate for 
collaboration in the context of complex projects. This is because such contracts bind 
partnering firms by strict rules with little space for flexibility and agility; hence, employees 
are prevented from exercising collaborative behaviour. Therefore, a number of contracts have 
been developed that are especially designed to enable collaboration and are tailored to 
particular industry needs. The interviewees refer to these contracts simply as collaborative 
contracts. 
So we do a lot of our work under something called NEC. It’s a form of engineering 
contract, a New Engineering Contract, and there are options within that. So this is 
where our cost-plus approach comes, and a lot of our work is based on that. That in 
itself is a collaborative contract (Senior Purchasing Manager, Air traffic). 
Designing an appropriate contract from the outset is perceived as a key enabler for 
collaboration. Contracts that foster collaboration allow for the legitimisation of a 
collaborative environment within a project. 
You have to have the vision from the outset to draft a contract that will support what 
you want to achieve as part of your joint vision for the programme (Head of 
Corporate Responsibility, Constructor C). 
What we want is a clean contract; just allow for people who want to work 
collaboratively, to do that without the noise (Regional Manager, Tech B). 
Furthermore, the respondents largely acknowledge the need to account for the dynamic 
and flexible nature of complex projects by periodically reviewing and changing the 
contractual specifications (e.g., detailed project activities and resources) where needed, as 
part of the ongoing contracting process: 
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We leave such a lot of flexibility in the main contract. So recognising that the [client] 
is transforming, it wasn’t in their best interest or ours to try and lock down everything 
that would be accomplished over a three-year period. So what we did was to identify 
in the contract, at a higher level, the types of resources that would be available and 
could be provided, and then the details of what’s actually used get written down in the 
tasking notes (Partnering Manager, Constructor Sweden). 
A contract is required to be flexible so that the project’s steering committee has the 
mandate to manage the project as needed, to further the best interests of the key stakeholders. 
Such autonomy is considered imperative since day-to-day activities are impossible to detail 
formally. The following quotes show how the respondents perceived the governing power of 
contracts: 
What we work [on] is contracted – not how we work (Executive Coach, Coach A). 
The contract is one thing, and how you behave is different. And there is a fine line, 
but if the contract’s written correctly, you can actually flex with it (Construction 
Manager, Engineering C). 
KPIs or a strategic requirement is being defined by a measurement in a contract, but 
actually, the method of making that measurement isn’t being defined. So there’s an 
output that says you’ll save this amount of money over this amount of time. […] But 
actually, the parts that make up that saving are not defined (Collaborative Work 
Manager, Rail). 
4.2.2. Contractual functions 
The findings show that the contracts fostering collaboration still perform their traditional 
safeguarding function to ensure the quality of the project outcome. The safeguarding-oriented 
clauses include costs, payment methods, conditions for subcontracting, tests and inspections, 
compensation conditions, the dispute resolution adjudication process, the limitation of 
liability and low performance damages, amongst others. For instance, these safeguarding 
functions are detailed in clause 8 in the NEC3 contract template (D9 in Table 2, pp. 21–23).  
The collaborative contracts also include several coordination- and adaptation-oriented clauses 
that differentiate them from traditional transactional contracts (which are based on strict 
deadlines and costing arrangements). These clauses include the creation and empowerment of 
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a core governance team for the project, providing this core group with the authority for 
decision-making, assurances of working together in a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation, 
the requirement to give an early warning for any issues affecting work and the establishment 
of common operational systems to enhance collaboration. For example, in NEC3, Options 
X12 and X13 clearly detail coordination- and adaptation-oriented clauses (D9, pp. 50–52). To 
encourage collaboration amongst project partners, these clauses include incentives for 
completion of tasks, bonuses for early deliveries and acceleration. These contractual clauses 
have implications for how collaboration is governed through relational mechanisms during 
the actual delivery, as follows: 
 creation of governance steering teams, including joint venture boards and steering 
committees; 
 securing leadership buy-in from the executive management of partnering firms; 
 legitimisation of a collaborative work environment; 
 creation of shared operational systems and infrastructures; 
 development of a framework agreement on costs, incentives and key performance 
indicators (KPIs); 
 definition of commercial and strategic risk management; and 
 ensuring stakeholder engagement. 
These contracts were identified to set up the enabling governance structures and relational 
mechanisms for projects as crucial for project success. Collaboration is not achieved solely 
by inter-firm contracting; rather, governance mechanisms are also required to drive personal 
motivation and engagement with the partners. Many of the collaborative contracts include 
clauses on incentives and bonuses to motivate the individuals to shift their mind-sets and 
ways of working from a focus on the organisation’s interests, to a focus on collaboration and 
the interests of the project. These incentives are discussed in detail in the following 
subsection. 
4.2.3. Contractual incentives 
Many of the studied contracts have built-in incentive models, both financial and non-
financial. A common arrangement in the UK is a mutually agreed client–supplier pain/gain 
share contract that rewards high performance and penalises less-than-satisfactory 
performance. These incentive-based clauses may also contribute to the flexibility needed for 
collaboration: 
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They [incentives] give a degree of flexibility. They give you the ability to be flexible 
on spending. Save some and then agree perhaps to spend it on something innovative 
or different that you weren’t originally going to do but has come up since you started, 
and it can create buckets of money that give you those opportunities to improve things 
(Project Support Manager, Engineering A). 
Some respondents strongly criticised financial incentives, claiming such incentives 
discourage collaboration by causing people to focus on specific outcomes, which might not 
always align with what is the best for the project. 
There’s a place potentially for incentives, but they have to be incentives in line with 
the collaborative outcomes. And they shouldn't be purely financial, and they shouldn't 
be purely focused on monetary outcomes. They should be focused on a broader range 
of outcomes (Quality Manager, Constructor D). 
Overall, the respondents note that many collaborative contracts have an apparent 
disconnect between motivators for individuals and motivators for companies. 
The thing is that a contract is with a company, it isn’t with an individual. So we’ve 
got to motivate the individual. If the individual doesn’t gain anything from a contract, 
then it doesn’t matter to them whether they implement it or not (Business 
Improvement Manager, Constructor E). 
Some companies have dedicated teams to design ‘smart incentives’ based on adaptations 
of the collaborative contracts, in order to bridge the gap between inter-firm incentives and 
individual/team-based incentives. Furthermore, some firms have moved away from financial 
incentives towards including behavioural incentives. 
They call it the shadow of the future. Saying that, if you do this project very well, then 
we will give you, we will want to work with you on the next project, and that type of 
incentive is really efficient, because that will also motivate the people outside of the 
project to promote the right behaviour (Enterprise Strategy Consultant, Tech A). 
Overall, partnering firms within complex projects include incentives at the firm, team and 
individual levels. These are usually grouped as financial or behavioural incentives that 
facilitate inter-firm collaboration in complex projects.  
23 
4.3 Relational mechanisms to govern collaboration 
4.3.1 Flexible work environment 
It was clear from the dataset that relational mechanisms play a critical role during the 
delivery of complex projects. Many respondents argued that the dynamic day-to-day 
operations should rely mostly on relational governance mechanisms, whilst the formal 
contract should set out the overarching governance terms and conditions. A common theme 
across the interviews related to the role of relational mechanisms in creating a flexible work 
environment, which was required for promoting collaboration in complex projects: 
The contracts just set out the framework, the legalese, the rules of engagement, […] 
and then how you work together afterwards can be set out in relationship management 
plans and in other documents to give you the flexibility. And then you put the contract 
in the drawer, and then you only ever get it out if you're really falling out 
(Collaborative Work Manager, Rail). 
Many interviews considered the ways in which relational governance in complex projects 
has changed as a result of the introduction of the collaboration standard. One interviewee 
noted that the standard has enabled the company to combine different relational mechanisms 
to form a relationship governance framework: 
This platform is the first one that was done that combines everything that we do all in 
one service [...], and it’s a nice high-profile, well-thought of [structure]. We’ve got a 
great relationship through the [collaboration] framework with this client. They should 
be and remain our best reference customer to help us with other business (Consultant, 
Consultant A). 
Another interviewee pointed out that all the existing guidance on relational mechanisms 
was too abstract prior to the introduction of the collaboration standard: 
So all the guidance on collaborative working talks about the theory instead of things 
like, you need a joint relationship management plan or a joint risk register or exit 
strategy. But nobody ever told us about these before (Regional Manager, Tech B). 
4.3.2 Relational practices 
The findings showed that mutual trust, openness, commitment and confidence are built as a 
result of emerging relational practices triggered by the use of the standard and collaborative 
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contracts. Many relational practices have been introduced such as open-book accounting and 
risk registers: 
We make sure that we get a long-term acceptable profit because we’ve got open book 
accounting. That’s one way to build trust and just have everyone commit to everyone 
having decent and fair earning[s] in the project (Business Improvement Director, 
Constructor E). 
We put a giant risk register together. And you manage the whole register, so you’ll 
see my risks, and you’re working on my risks as though they’re your own risks, but 
you own that register. […] It’s a great environment for people to work in because they 
feel part of something (UK Technology Sales Director, Tech C). 
The interviews identified a long list of relational practices that have been operationalised 
to foster inter-firm collaboration during the actual delivery of complex projects. One common 
theme is that these practices are not dictated by the contract; rather, they are enabled by a 
collaborative environment within which project partners interact and work. Table 3 provides 
a list of these relational practices for collaboration, including those related to the project, the 
customer engagement, the supply chain management and stakeholder involvement. These 
practices demonstrate how a strategic intention to collaborate through standardised 
contractual processes translates into a flexible work environment that allows for the 
emergence of relational practices for collaboration. Overall, these practices emerge in a 
collective and flexible manner to cater to the emergent needs of the project. 
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Table 3. Identified relational practices for collaboration 
Identified Relational Practices for Collaboration within Complex Projects 
Project-related practices 
- Strategic co-location of partners 
- Integrated programme generation 
- Joint OPEX forecasting 
- Joint CAPEX scenario planning 
- Collaborative skills development 
- Early contractor involvement to build trust 
and confidence 
- Training for multicultural and younger 
workforce 
- Measuring collaboration’s impact on other 
suppliers and wider industry 
- Industry-wide commercial director forum, 
which produces guidance notes, example 
contracts and young talent forums  
- Weekly JV conference classes 
- War room for crisis management 
- Fortnightly design review 
- Commercial and risk review meetings –
commercial trackers  
- Health and safety forums 
- Hazard workshops 
- Contract awareness workshops 
- Lessons learned workshops 
- 360° workshops for the project teams  
- Meeting training and time management 
workshops 
- Business collaborator software 
- Project acceleration coaching and 
teamwork (PACT) workshop  
- JV value register 
- JV lessons learned register  
- Regular social parties  
- Behaviour and process correlation models  
 
Customer engagement  
- Customer becoming part of provider’s 
interview panel for recruitment  
- Customers attending provider’s supplier 
meetings 
- Individual training and mentoring on client 
focus and collaborative behaviour 
- On-site user support 
- Customer becoming part of alliance 
- Back-to-back contracts 
- Customers’ and suppliers’ joint induction 
programme 
- Two-way partner selection 
- BIM 360° and customer access 
Supply chain management 
- Supply chain council  
- 360° workshops with partners and suppliers  
- Multi-part joined-up supply chain 
- Establishing supply chain community 
- Joint process forecasting and reporting  
- Tiers 2 and 3 conferences 
- Back-to-back terms and conditions for supply 
chain 
- Synchronised contract training (with provider 
and supplier teams) 
- Relationship segmentation 
Stakeholder/community involvement 
- Creating a magazine to inform multiple 
stakeholders of the project and the community 
- Public liaison officers 
- Voluntary community clarity workshops 
- Door-to-door resident meet-ups 
- Steering group to manage local disputes 
- Creating social and community contribution 
projects, such as Guinness World Record for 
charity – most people dressed as penguins 
- Look-ahead Monday meetings 
  
26 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
This section discusses the main findings by means of three working propositions that stress 
the emerging role of collaboration standards and their impact on contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms in complex projects. It also elucidates research and managerial 
contributions as well as limitations and avenues for further research.  
5.1 Discussion  
This study provides new insights regarding the governance of collaboration in complex 
projects, especially about the emerging role of standards. The extant literature stresses the 
ability to collaborate effectively and develop related norms in project settings (e.g., Davies et 
al., 2016). Developing shared collaboration norms amongst project partners requires 
significant time, which poses challenges in the context of time-limited projects (DeFillippi 
and Sydow, 2016; Jones et al., 1997). The findings highlight the importance of the 
collaboration standard ISO 44001, the adoption of which may even constitute a prerequisite 
for tendering for complex projects. The study shows that the adoption of the collaboration 
standard and the pre-contract evaluation of project partners’ collaborative competence have 
emerged as specific responses to prior performance failures associated with competitive 
bidding and the resulting fragmented, adversarial relationships (e.g., Egan Report, 1998; 
Government Construction Strategy, 2016). The standard helps reduce information 
asymmetries insofar as they are considered by customers (King et al., 2005; Christmann and 
Taylor, 2006) during the evaluation and selection of project consortia. The standard operates 
at an institutional level in that it reflects the institutional context and the related macro-culture 
and norms developed within networks of organisations involved in complex projects (Jones et 
al., 1997; Manning and Sydow, 2011). As such, it enables project firms to take a shortcut in 
the development of collaborative norms and know-how by fostering the adoption of tried-
and-tested contractual and relational practices. This is particularly valuable in the context of 
time-limited projects that may lack the time needed to develop shared collaborative norms 
(DeFillippi and Sydow, 2016; Jones et al., 1997). Accordingly, the standard influences the 
design of formal contracts and relational mechanisms, which are subsequently used to govern 
exchange relationships in complex projects. In light of these findings, we propose the 
following: 
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Proposition 1: The adoption of collaboration standard in complex projects reduces the 
cost and duration of developing collaborative norms by promoting the use of attested 
contractual and relational practices. 
The empirical research reveals the specific ways in which the collaboration standard, 
formal contracts and relational governance mechanisms interrelate. The standard helps 
formalise collaboration practices for managing inter-firm relations, which can be captured in 
contracts and industry-level contract templates. ISO 44001 also provides guidelines for 
building flexibility in contracts by including coordination and adaptation-oriented provisions 
that are conducive to collaboration. This contractual flexibility (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) is 
demonstrated by the use of ‘tasking note’ contracts, which include open-ended specifications 
of actual project tasks. In addition, the standard explicitly refers to the adaptation of contracts 
over time, thus allowing flexible formal/contractual governance to create responsiveness to 
evolving requirements in complex projects (Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). This conclusion 
leads us to the second proposition: 
Proposition 2: The adoption of the collaboration standard in complex projects enables 
building flexibility into contractual governance mechanisms by requiring the use of 
coordination and adaptation-oriented provisions in formal contracts. 
Although the adoption of the collaboration standard is required by some customers in 
particular industries as part of the tendering process, there is no conclusive evidence to 
suggest that the standard has been institutionalised and reflected in regulations in the same 
way as other management standards such as ISO 9001 or ISO 14001 (see, e.g., King et al., 
2005). In addition, the implementation of the collaboration standard is currently met with 
challenges, notably the difficulty facing project partner firms to go beyond symbolic 
implementation of the standard (Christmann and Taylor, 2006) and truly internalise a 
collaborative culture. Hence, the role of relational mechanisms during the project delivery 
phase is paramount for project partners to develop practices that operationalise collaboration 
(see Table 3) in their daily working relationships. Formal contracts emphasising 
coordination- and adaptation-oriented provisions facilitate the development of such relational 
practices; hence, they foster the use of relational governance (Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). In 
particular, relational practices that have been identified to work well in a number of 
collaborative settings are captured and codified in the collaboration standard. In this way, the 
standard enables formalization of relational practices, thus allowing companies to benefit 
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from lessons learned across similar complex projects. Based on this conclusion, we formulate 
the third proposition as follows: 
Proposition 3: The adoption of the collaboration standard in complex projects enables 
formalisation of relational mechanisms for governing inter-firm relations by codifying 
lessons learned regarding relational practices. 
5.2 Research contributions 
This paper makes a threefold contribution to research. First, the study contributes to the 
literature regarding the tensions between flexibility and standardisation in project 
environments (e.g., Davies and Hobday, 2005; Brax and Jonsson, 2009; Müller et al., 2014; 
DeFillippi and Sydow, 2016) by demonstrating how this dual requirement may be addressed 
in the context of governance of collaboration. In particular, the study shows the emerging role 
of the collaboration standard and its influence on contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms. The standard’s guidelines contribute to codifying the informal practices of 
managing inter-firm relations and transferring related learning (e.g., on the use of exit 
strategies) across projects. In this sense, the standard may contribute to economies of 
repetition and efficiencies (Davies and Brady, 2000), specifically in terms of the ability to 
collaborate to co-produce project outcomes. At the same time, the standard allows for 
flexibility regarding the enactment of formal contracts, depending on the scope and aims of 
specific projects.  
Second, the study contributes to research on the governance of complex projects (e.g., 
Davies and Brady, 2000; Brady et al., 2005; Müller et al., 2014) by demonstrating how the 
role of the standard is beginning to emerge in the governance of collaboration. The study 
adds to the insights of the extant literature regarding the role of contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms and their interplay (Roehrich and Lewis, 2014; Wacker et al., 2016), 
by discussing the influence of the collaboration standard on these mechanisms. The need for 
the collaboration standard has partly emerged as a result of failures in prior project 
collaborations (Egan Report, 1998; NAO, 2001). In particular, the standard informs the 
design of contractual provisions that facilitate collaboration, and helps formalise 
collaborative practices.  
Third, the research extends the literature on the importance of collaboration in project 
settings (Davies, 2004; DeFillippi and Sydow, 2016; Davies et al., 2016) as it demonstrates 
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that the increasing adoption of such standards has been driven by explicit customer 
requirements. The study shows that the ability to collaborate is increasingly required by 
customers of complex projects. It indicates that providers of complex projects may rely on 
the standard as a source of codified know-how to structure and enact collaboration with 
customers, consortia partners and supply chain counterparts across projects. The 
formalisation of collaboration through the standard may act as a source of vicarious learning 
(Lumineau et al., 2011) by codifying lessons learned regarding collaboration practices across 
multiple projects and industries. As such, the collaboration standard may allow firms to take a 
shortcut in the development of shared cooperative norms; hence, the standard would embody 
collective, experience-based knowledge that is shared amongst organisations (Lowendahl et 
al., 2001).  
5.3 Managerial implications 
The study provides twofold implications for managers of companies involved in the delivery 
of complex projects. First, demanding customers are beginning to require evidence of 
collaboration competence as part of their tendering process. Accordingly, suppliers must 
seriously consider building and strengthening these capabilities in order to respond to these 
market changes. Adopting the ISO 44001 collaboration standard can be a structured way to 
facilitate the development of collaborative competence and build legitimacy among potential 
customers and partners (King et al., 2005). However, this should only be part of an overall 
process. It should also be complemented by employee training and by fostering the 
development of a collaborative culture. 
Second, the effective delivery of complex projects requires that organisations use 
relational governance mechanisms in a manner that is conducive to inter-organisational 
collaboration. Organisations must also design their contractual relationships so that mutual 
trust and a flexible working environment can be created. Here, the collaboration standard can 
offer valuable guidance into the complementary use of contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms. Even so, implementation will naturally give rise to new challenges. For 
instance, building the momentum for getting the entire organisation on board for the required 
changes may take a considerable amount of time and effort. Employees may struggle to see 
the benefits, which may mean the standard’s implementation might be perceived as being 
about ticking the boxes or nominating a few individuals to be responsible for collaboration. 
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Through increasing the awareness of possible issues, this study aids companies in finding 
ways to solve related problems and improve performance. 
5.4 Limitations and future research 
This paper presents some limitations, which can be addressed in further research. First, the 
empirical study did not explicitly focus on how organisations involved in the delivery of 
complex projects develop collaborative competence over time (Davies et al., 2016), and what 
types of project-specific learning might be required to build such competence. Due to the 
study’s exploratory nature, the empirical enquiry concentrated on a cross-industry 
investigation to acquire a broad overview of the phenomenon under scrutiny. Future research 
should take a processual perspective (Pettigrew, 1990) and employ longitudinal case-based 
research designs to examine in-depth the ways in which project partners develop their 
competencies and how they learn to collaborate in complex project settings. 
This exploratory study has drawbacks in terms of the generalisability of the findings. 
Although the study has covered a broad range of organisations and industries and has offered 
rich insights into the governance of inter-firm collaboration in complex projects, it cannot 
quantify phenomena related to the collaboration standard. Neither can the study argue for 
explicit differences across industries. Here, a large-scale survey could help map the adoption 
of the collaboration standard across project-based industries and uncover its impacts on 
performance at the project and organisational levels. In addition, our data considers primary 
project firm relationships, while future research may look into wider collaboration in supply 
chains including subcontractors, designers, and second- and third-tier suppliers in relation to 
governance. The study also focusses mainly on the UK-based operations of international 
companies and it does not provide enough data to draw inferences on possible national and 
cultural differences regarding the governance of collaboration in complex projects. Future 
studies could implement qualitative comparative methods to examine how relational norms, 
for example, differ in this sense and what implications this may have on the 
interdependencies among the collaboration standard, contracts and relational governance 
mechanisms. 
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Appendix A: Interview protocol 
Company’s name: 
Interviewee’s name:   
Interviewee’s position: 
Topics to be covered within the semi-structured interviews 
 Personal background and history. 
 Job role and responsibilities. 
 Describe the complex project context and operating environment. 
 Explain your involvement and responsibility in the governance of collaboration. 
 How has the complex project market evolved over recent years in terms of collaborative 
relationships? 
 How important is the governance of collaboration in complex projects? 
Probe: Have you experienced demands from your clients and other stakeholders to 
demonstrate collaborative capability? 
 Explain how you plan or design the governance of collaboration in projects. 
Probe: How do you account for flexibility and uncertainty in collaborations? 
 How does the nature of complex projects affect collaboration? 
 How did you come to use the standard for collaboration (BS 11000/ISO 44001)? 
 What were the factors that enabled formalisation through the standard?  
Probe: What were the benefits and what has changed in terms of governance?  
 Have you experienced any differences in the complex projects that used the standard? 
 What were the challenges associated with implementation of the standard in complex projects? 
Probe: How was certification achieved for the collaboration standard? 
 What are the contractual arrangements between you and your project partners in complex 
projects? 
Probe: How influential are these contracts in your decisions and activities? 
 How did the standard impact contractual agreements? 
Probe: What were the industry-specific collaborative contracts?  
 What do these collaborative contracts entail in terms of their content? 
 How do the contracts account for flexibility required in projects? 
Probe: What are the specific clauses or incentives? 
 How were day-to-day collaborative operations governed in complex projects? 
 What specific relational practices were used? 
Probe: How were these practices operationalized? Detail any relational collaborative practices 
concerning project partners, customers, supply chain and other key stakeholders. 
 How do the project partners manage these relational practices? 
Probe: How were these practices introduced? Were they dictated by the contract? What was 
the role of the standard? 
 Explain how you acquire and accumulate useful knowledge, resources and capital from 
collaborative projects. 
 How do you capture and transfer the knowledge learned from one collaboration to another? 
 How did the standard contribute to learning? 
 What was the content of your exit strategy? 
Probe: Was an exit strategy formally discussed before the introduction of the standard? 
Ending the interview 
 Permission to contact to clarify our understanding  
 Permission to contact the named individuals indicated in the interview 
 Thank the interviewee for his or her time and involvement in this research 
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